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Law, State and Politics
By GIORGIo

DE. VEccuIo

THE modern world is m turmoil; an obscure threat puts peace m
jeopardy, bringing to our mind the horrors of the two recent world
wars. It would be an immense disaster for mankind if those horrors
were to be repeated, in an even more catastrophic way, because of the
greater power of the means of destruction. The only thing that can save
us from such disaster is the law, which ought to inspire international
politics and secure a just and peaceful world. Easy as it is to state
this concept in general terms, it is by no means easy to determine its

precise meaning, so many are the errors and prejudices which stand
in the way of the solution of the problem.
The word 'law" involves an ambiguity In a merely formal sense,
law means a coordination of relationships, by which certain rights
correspond to certain obligations. In this sense, law necessarily exists
in any condition of human life, because a complex of social relations
is always involved. For tis reason a state cannot exist without its
own law, that is, a juridical order of which it is precisely- the center
and the subject. The problem changes if we mean by law an essential
attribute of the human person, by virtue of which he can insist upon
absolute respect for his spiritual nature. When the state is based on
this, we call it a state ruled by law Better than that and to avoid any
misunderstanding, we should call it a state ruled by justice.1 But questions of words are unimportant provided the concept is clearly defined.
Besides, the expression "state of law" is so common today that any
attempt to try to eliminate it would be in vain. What really counts is

to recognize clearly that this expression does not refer to a state which
has a positive formal legal order (an unfailing situation), but only to
a state which conforms to the ideal of justice, in other words one which
acknowledges the fundamental rights of the human person.
In this way we reaffirm a concept, already announced in classical
antiquity, developed by the sublime maxims of the Christian message,
and demonstrated anew in modern philosophy; the concept, in a word,
of natural law We know that this concept is still opposed by different
* Professor enieritus and former Rector of the Umversity of Rome.

11 proposed this several years ago (DEL Vccmo, LA GrusTzA 132 (3d ed. 1946)
and also in succeeding editions), and again recently as a theme which has been discussed at the sixth conference of the Italian Society of the Philosophy of Law ("The
State of Law and the State of Justice").
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schools, which often repeat old errors, already peremptorily refuted.
Some authors affirm a prorz that they admit only positive law, and,
from this arbitrary postulate, they deduce, with evident paralogism,
that natural law does not exist. Others, referring to the inexactness
of certain formulae used, perhaps merely as a linguistic device, about
natural law by some authors of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, consider this verbal inexactness as a sufficient proof of the
erroneousness of the fundamental thought of those authors and innumerable others who before and after them have elaborated the
same doctrine without concurring in that inexactness. Others (for
example, B. Croce) rely upon the mutability of human laws as a reason
for rejecting the concept of a rational or natural law,2 overlooking the
often demonstrated fact that certain external rules of reason may be
conciliated with their various applications through the course of
history Thomas Aquinas, for instance, has clearly explained that the
principles of the law of nature, immutable in themselves, cannot always be applied in the same manner, but must be subject to particular circumstances "et secundum personas, et secundumn negotia, et
secunduin tempora."3 There is, in short, in human laws, an element of
relativity which does not exclude their absolute basis.4 This basis,
the law of nature, is a criterion by which we can identify justice, as
well as possible deviations from it, due to the fallibility of the human
mind, since in the form of legality may be included a real injustice.
The meaning of that law, which corresponds to an inprescriptible
requirement of our conscience, is intrinsically deontological, as an
ought, that remains valid above the empirical sphere. The fact that
fins law can be violated does not destroy its value. Only a false
philosophy ignores that the human being, although he belongs to a
material world, is also partaking of universal and eternal ideas and
norms. For this reason he feels himself free and responsible, because
of a light of natural reason which imposes on him an obligation to
respect ethics in both its basic forms, charity and justice. For this reason he is entitled, in the name of ethics, to insist upon respect for his
personal dignity
It must be remarked that the ethical principle is unique, and
2
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1950).
3 See ST. THOmAS, SuMm& THEOL, la, 2ae, q. 95-97. Cf. SuArz, DE LEGMUS AC

DEo IEGISLATORE, book I, ch. 13, at 3-5.
4 On this can be seen my essay Mutabilita ed eternita del diritto (m the law review Jus, March 1954), and m 11 STUDi suL DimSo 5-26 (1958).
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manifests itself in its two forms, previously mentioned, because it
produces norms, respectively, for each individual and for the relations
among several subjects. Justice is nothing other than the social profile
of ethics.
From these elementary notions a correct conception of state and
politics can be deduced. But how many erroneous theories have been
developed to the contrary! To mention only a few of the well-known,
we recall that, according to Machiavelli, the state should be understood as strength or power to command, without any moral limitations;
from which follows the justification of the absolute power of the prince,
and his privilege to use violence and cruelty, trickery and fraud.5
Machiavelli had in mind, in fact, a noble purpose: to establish a
unitary state and "to free Italy from the hands of the barbarians",
but his fatal mistake was to believe that to reach a desired end, any
means, even the most immoral, are justified. In Machiavelli's words
we still find something of value mingled with imperfections; but the
extreme mmoralism of Nietzche's work is even less estimable. It is
well known that with his extravagant "inversion of all values" he not
only harshly opposed the fundamental principles of ethics, but also
the idea of the state itself, which he defined simply as "a monster."6
Croce, on the contrary, exalts the state, but defends "the amoralism
of politics, the pnority of politics to morals";7 a theory that resembles
Machiavelli's, but without the relative justifications of Machiavelli by
reason of the circumstances and customs of his time. Ths justification
cannot be granted to those who today defend a similar theory, after the
state has been built, with so much labor of thought and at the sacrifice
of so much blood, on a basis of liberty and brotherhood, principles
which Croce derides as "stupid formulae."8
Although these fallacious theories have been widely publicized,
making their authors famous (because paradox and error solicit fame
more than does truth), the main principles of ethics, including those
which deal with the law and the state, have always been kept alive
in the conscience of the civilized peoples, as can be seen not only in
the works of many writers, but likewise in constitutional laws and
international documents. It is enough to recall, for example, that the
Constitution of the Republic of Italy "acknowledges and guarantees
ch. 18 (1513).
AanusTRA 69 (Lipsia ed. 1904).
7
CRocE, Ermvmrn n PosxrcA 27 (3d ed., Ban, 1949). See also, by the same
author, against natural law, CRocE, FH~ososI Drm& PRAC=CA 324 (6th ed., Ban, 1950).
8 CRocE, ELEsmN- Di Por-mcA 23 (3d ed., Ban, 1949).
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the inviolable rights of man" (Art. 2), and that a similar statement
appears m the United Nations' "Uiversal Declaration of Human
Rights" of December 10, 1948.
The old sophism according to which the art of politics is not bound
to respect truth but consists rather in the art of dissembling, has been
expressed in many proverbs, still often quoted. This accounts for the
persistence of deplorable mistakes in the analysis of the relation of
politics and morals. The silence dictated by prudence, a virtue needed
by everyone and especially by statesmen, has been confused with the
vice of falsehood, a vice the more blameable as the social position of
those who practice it is more elevated. For this reason Romagnosi
observes that statesmen should be an example of truth and loyalty 9
All of Mazzi's noble work is inspired by the "worship of truth," and
strongly opposes a "diplomacy based on lies" and also "the theory of
useful crimes and convement falsehood, and others of a like nature."
"It is necessary and urgent," he stated, "to establish politics on a moral
basis."o Addressing himself especially to the youth of Italy, he urged
them to "throw away the Machiavellian notions of tactics and convemence. A nation is not created in such a manner; it is created by
the truth, the boldness of faith, and by sacrifice." This brilliant description of the process of creating a nation is confirmed by history itself,
because the unity of Italy was obtained by virtue and heroism, while
the deceptive and false counsels of Machiavelli failed to liberate Italy
from either internal discord or foreign domination.
Healthy politics cannot survive apart from the principles of morality and justice, which have been engraved m the human spirit because
of its rational nature. Such are the principles to which the constitutions
of states which wish to be considered "states of law," should be
adapted. It is the responsibility of politics to apply and to develop these
principles in the particular social environment and factual conditions
of each nation. The application of these principles requires an unceasing labor, because the life of the state has no pause, circumstances
change, and in the very center of the state frequently arise differences
and contrasts, which politics should endeavor to solve, always aiming
at the basis of the state and its essential goals.
No one, moreover, can deny the fact (demonstrated clearly not
only by history, but also by present experience) that a state can be
03
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organized on a basis other than one indicated by natural law or reason, which theology conceives as a reflection of the Divine wisdom.
A state can exist if there be power in fact over a certain population in
a definite territory, even though this power be based only on force
and not on law in the sense we have previously explained. In that
case, there will be a politics supporting such power; but, in opposition
to it, another politics, inspired by the most profound motives of the
human soul, will try to establish a state of justice. This can be attained
through reforms, or in the most extreme case by revolution. The celestial voice of conscience can never be kept indefinitely silent; numberless examples of this can be found throughout history Famous are
the words of Antigone in Sophocles' tragedy, who called upon "the unchangeable laws of the Gods" against a cruel decree of a tyrant; words
which, according to Yves de la Briere, are "le temoignage de l'ame
naturellement chr6tienne."" Not less famous is that "appeal to heaven"
which Locke indicated as the last resort when it is not possible to appeal to an earthly authority ' 2 Similar are the expressions of William
Tell in Schiller's play- the power of tyrants has a limit ("eme Grenze
hat Tyrannenmacht"), and when its oppressive weight becomes intolerable, the oppressed draw from heaven their eternal rights, inviolable
as the stars."3

The state, as an order of positive law, is formally considered a
sovereign. Sovereignty can be understood, however, in two entirely
different senses: as absolute, arbitrary power, or as power bound to
law and therefore not unlimited. In the same way the liberty of the
individual can be conceived either as simple will or as an authority
subordinated to law It is easy to discern that in the first sense sovereignty and liberty have no moral values whatsoever. A state winch
considers itself free of the obligation to respect the fundamental rights
of its citizens, much less those of other states, or even international
treaties signed by itself, is not a true state; it is an outrage to human

reason and a permanent threat to world peace. In a similar way, it is
an illusion to consider a man free when he is subject to the impulses
of passion; only he is free who obeys the laws of his own spiritual
nature.
There is no need to discourse further these elementary concepts
in order to refute the grave errors we have mentioned. It is worthwhile, however, to note that equally unacceptable is a thesis which
'Yves
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came into prominence at the Peace of Westphalia (1648), according
to which a state is bound only to the rules of international law to which
it has given its own consent. To tell the truth, it does not seem that the
Treaty of Westphalia meant to deny the existence of a law of reason,
valid for all nations; the real intention was rather to emphasize that
no state should be placed under the leadership of other states or of
other similar powers. The interpretation of that treaty, given by some
authors, is therefore probably not exact. At any rate, it is certain that
the ideal of a natural society of the human race, conceived in classical
antiquity, and validated by Christianity, was partially applied, as well
before the Peace of Westphalia, as m the following centuries and
especially in modem times. But this ideal has not yet been completely
attained, and appears still as a distant goal.
The unitary organization toward which history proceeds, in order
to be healthy and vital, must be based on the same principles, established, as we have said, by the constitution of each state. The adherence to that international organization must be considered as obligatory and not optional, as it is presently considered by the United
Nations. No state has the right to refuse to enter into peaceful relations
with the other states of the world. It is for this reason that the great
Spanish jurist Francisco De Vitoria affirmed that "totus orbis aliquo
modo est una respublica."14 He accordingly insisted on the principle
of free commuication among the nations for peaceful purposes, and
considered the violation of this principle one of the few just reasons for
war.i5 The same concept was defended, not long afterward, by other
great jurists and philosophers, such as Alberico Gentili and Francisco
Suarez.
To become a member of the universal society does not mean that
all states should possess equal functions and powers. A distinction must
be drawn between the legitimate states and those which ignore the
essential rights of the human person. Only to the former, in my opinion,
should be given voting power, at least in the more important matters;
while to the latter could be given secondary functions, with the statement that they would participate in the important matters only after
a reform of their imperfect constitutions; a requirement which would
undoubtedly serve as an incentive for such reform.
A false parity which does not take into account differences of
14 DE VrroBIA, DE POTESTATE CIVIL! 21 (1557).
15
DE VrroRTA, DE INDIs P cmrSm INVENmTS § 3 et seq. (1557); DE Trmixa
LEcrIlis; BELxcnO, DE INDiS, SIVE DE JURE BELL- HIsPANORum IN BARBAROS.
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capacity, merit and attitude, when these differences are really serious,
is a grave error; it should be noted that the United Nations is not free
from such an error, since in modem times it has admitted as members
a large number of nations which have hardly emerged from barbarism
and are absolutely without valid constitutional rules. Such states have
been equated with some of the most civilized states. By another obvious anomaly the charter of the United Nations has given a privileged
position to five states, considered "original members," certainly not
all of which respect human rights, but each of which has a veto power
over the deliberations of the others on all the most important matters.
As a consequence of these defects we have already experienced no little
difficulty, and in that hide more serious dangers, especially when, as
cannot be demed, any of the privileged members collaborate with
many states which ignore liberty and justice, for the purpose of opposng the states which defend those ideals.
We should not, however, repudiate this organization, but seek to
have it correct its imperfections, in order to be able to attain more
effectively its noble goal. If this is not done, no one can guarantee
that, like the defunct League of Nations, the United Nations itself
will not be superseded by another organization which would be a
better defender of human rights.
Of great importance meanwhile is adhesion to those international
organizations which, although formed of small numbers of states, are
really more valid defenders of civilization and peace, because they are
more homogeneous and are founded on a real community of principles
and ideals. To call in question the fidelity to these organizations, constituted with the collaboration of Italy, would be on our part more than
an error and would come nearer to a crime.
A sterile neutralism is a sign of a bad conscience, and has never
succeeded in assuring peace, which, like justice, can be safeguarded
only by vigilant and resolute action. We must remember that, accordng to Lactantius" maxim, "militia est in ipsa ]ustitia," and that a
timorous yearning for a quiet life not only has never prevented war,
but sometimes has provoked it, as recent experience has clearly demonstrated.
False is the policy that tries to keep at equal distances the good and
the bad, civilization and barbarism. By a false egalitarianism we have
consented to abandon colonies, which had put semi-barbarous peoples
on the road of progress, with the result of creating states where base
passions such as race hatred have risen, and from which fires of anarchy
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and tyranny have often spread. That has not prevented, as we have
remarked, the admission of such states, with parity of rights, into the
United Nations.
Past political errors are almost always irreparable (quod factum
est, infectum fierz nequit), but we ought to recogmze them and make
every effort at least to prevent their repetition and aggravation. We
must always defend the supreme values of the spirit, and also the
truths of elementary logic which, although sufficiently obvious, have
many times been neglected and forgotten: for example, that he cannot
support international peace who puts m danger the peace of his own
house by fostering the struggle of classes.
A coherence is necessary between internal policy and external
policy A legitimate state, which accomplishes its mission, must protect
its own juridical order, manitaing righteously the integrity of its
own territory, and assisting the intellectual development of the nation.
It would be all the more blameable for us today to show any weakness
on the subject, after an unjust treaty by which Italy has been so cruelly mutilated.
At the same time, a state should not be self-contained and shut
itself off from other states. It must foster and facilitate the utmost communications with other peoples, particularly m intellectual matters. It
should work for the greatest possible agreement with other states, not
only for special objectives, but also with the purpose of organizing
a stable umon, which would include at least some of the European
states, on a basis of law and justice, since at present it is not possible,
on this basis, to have a union of all. We can proceed in this way, step
by step, to the positive construction of that universal society which
an indefectible postulate of human reason commands as a categorical
imperative.
We ardently hope that the crisis which presently threatens the
world shall be overcome and, according to the sublime invocation of
Pope Paul VI, peace, indissolubly bound to justice, will triumph at
last for all the ages to come.*
* Translated from the Italian by Professor Jovmiano Carvalho Neto, Sergife, Brazil,
with the advice and assistance of Professor Ralph A. Newman, Hastings College of the
Law. Tins article may be found, m Italian, m 42 RviST.A INTEaNAZIONALE Dr Fmosoar&
DEL Dmrrro 397 (1965).

